AUKUS is clearly an attempt by the U.S. to bolster regional security, including securing Australia’s seaborne trade.
AUKUS is based on a shared commitment of its three members to deepening diplomatic, security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Even though this has not been stated explicitly, the rise of China, particularly its rapid militarisation and aggressive behaviour, is undoubtedly the trigger.
DECADES-OLD PARTNERSHIP
As such, there is nothing surprising about the U.S., the U.K. and Australia coming together. The U.S. and the U.K. have enjoyed a special defence partnership for decades. The U.S. and the U.K. have fought together as allies, together with Australia, in the Second World War. The U.S. shared nuclear weapons technology with the U.K. following the merging of the latter’s nuclear weapons programme with the American Manhattan Project as early as in 1943.
The first U.K. test was conducted in 1952 in the Montebello Islands in Australia, a country that still regards the British monarch as the head of state, whose powers are exercised constitutionally through her representative, the Governor-General of Australia.
To suggest that these three nations have come together to forge a new defence pact is stating the obvious. They have been alliance partners all along.
ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA
For three nations, their relations with China have recently been marked by contretemps. Australia, especially, had for years subordinated its strategic assessment of China to transactional commercial interests.
Much to China’s chagrin, its policy of deliberately targeting Australian exports has not yielded the desired results.
Instead of kow-towing, the plucky Australian character has led Canberra to favour a fundamental overhaul of its China policy. The attempt to torment Australia has clearly backfired.
The AUKUS joint statement clearly acknowledges that trilateral defence ties are decades old, and that AUKUS aims to further joint capabilities and interoperability. The word “further” is key, since defence cooperation already exists.
The other areas covered are cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies, apart from undersea capabilities. The latter is the most visible part of the agreement, and potentially, a game-changer.
Elements in the broader agenda provide opportunities to the U.S., the U.K. and Australia to engage the regional countries. There are clear indications that New Zealand is open to cooperation with AUKUS in such areas, especially cyber, its nuclear-averse record notwithstanding. All three nations will also play a major role in U.S.-led programmes such as Build Back Better World, Blue Dot Network and Clean Network, to meet the challenge of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
A COMPARISON, THE REACH
The Quad and AUKUS are distinct, yet complementary. Neither diminishes the other. Whereas the Quad initiatives straddle the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, a Pacific-centric orientation for AUKUS has advantages. Such a strategy could potentially strengthen Japan’s security as well as that of Taiwan in the face of China’s mounting bellicosity. Shifting AUKUS’s fulcrum to the Pacific Ocean could reassure ASEAN nations.
It could also inure AUKUS to any insidious insinuation that accretion in the number of nuclear submarines plying the Indo-Pacific might upset the balance of power in the Indian Ocean.
China’s potent military capacities must be taken seriously. China has a large and growing undersea fleet, including attack submarines, both nuclear-powered and diesel-electric.
China’s naval power is enabling it to challenge U.S. dominance in the Pacific beyond the first island chain.
A U.S. that still boasts the world’s most powerful military is perhaps tempted to look at effective means to militarily counter China.
The Quad structure currently has neither the mandate nor the capability to achieve this. There are limited options in the economic arena with China already having emerged as a global economic powerhouse. AUKUS, though, provides an opportunity to the U.S. to place proxy submarine forces to limit China’s forays, especially in the Pacific Ocean.
(GS Paper-2/ International Relations/ Quad/ AUKUS)